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INTERACTIONS OF DIVIDENDS AND INVESTMENT: A TEST OF THE JOHN
AND WILLIAMS SIGNALLING EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of corporate
growth and investment on the dividend decision of the firm. Based on
a Signalling Equilibrium Model recently derived by John and Williams,
two empirically testable error components models are formulated.
Effects of growth opportunities are explicitly introduced in this
model. The results indicate: for low growth firms the investment
variable in both the dividend per share and the dividend payout
equations are negative and significant and for high growth firms these
variables are positive and significant. These results suggest that for
high growth firms the desire to pay more dividends and hence signalling
earning potential is not adversely effected by the investment decision,
while for low growth firms the dividend decision is adversely effected
by the investment decision because the signalling of earning potential
is not necessary for low growth firms.

INTERACTIONS OF DIVIDEND AND INVESTMENT: A TEST OF SIGNALLING
THEORY UNDER DIFFERENT GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES
Introduction
The interactions of investment policy and dividend policy have
concerned Spies [36], Fama [14], Dhrymes and Kurz [11], Miller and
Modigliani [31], Higgins [18], McCabe [29], McDonald, Jacquillant, and
Mussenbaum [30] , and Peterson and Benesh [33] , among others. Two
theories exist in the literature regarding the relationships between
investment and dividend decisions. The first, based on the perfect
capital market theorem, suggests that investment decisions and divi-
dend decisions of firms are not related since, in a perfect capital
market, optimal investment decisions by a firm are independent of how
such decisions are financed. The second, based on the assumption of
imperfect capital markets, proposes that they are negatively related
since dividends and investments are competing uses of limited internal
funds. Dhrymes and Kurz [11] and Fama [14] have developed simul-
taneous equation models to test these two extreme hypotheses and
obtain entirely different empirical results.
By applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least
squares (3SLS) to cross-sectional data for 181 individual firms, Dhry-
mes and Kurz [9] have found that investment decisions and dividend
decisions of firms are negatively and significantly related. By
applying OLS and 2SLS to time-series data for each of 298 firms, Fama
[14] has found that dividend and investment decisions of firms are
either not statistically related or positively related for most of the
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firms studied. He has also found that 2SLS estimates do not generally
perform better than OLS in terms of prediction errors and t-
statistics. He suggests that there is no evidence requiring the
treatment of dividend and investment decisions as interdependent
endogenous variables in a simultaneous-equation model. When trying to
sort out the reasons for the diverse findings of these two studies, we
cannot be certain whether the differences are caused by differences in
the underlying theory, or in the estimation methodologies. However,
our conclusion is; a new look is required to gain insight into the
problem by using a signalling equilibrium model derived by John and
Williams (19 ).
In the next section a review of the literature is presented,
followed by the development of an empirically testable model. Empiri-
cal results are presented and analyzed in the third section. In the
final section, a brief summary and conclusion is given.
I. Review of the Existing Literature
Our approach to the problem is from two dimensions: theoretical
and methodological. In this section we address the theoretical
problems and in the next section the methodological ones . In Figure I
an overview of the competing dividend theories is presented.
A serious problem which exists in the literature is the implicit
assumption that all firms behave homogeneously regarding dividend and
investment decisions; every study tries to prove the validity of one
or the other theories for all of the firms concerned. With the
heterogeneity of firms, it is doubtful that firms will behave in the
same way with regard to investment and dividend decisions. One of
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FIGURE I
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND THEORY
IRRELEVANCY THEORY
Dividends are irrelevant because:
1. Homemade dividends
2. Residual theory of dividends
3. Clientele effects
Literature:
Elton and Gruber [13]
Higgins [18]
Miller and Modigliani [31]
Pettit [34]
RELEVANCY THEORY
0% payout is best because:
1. Investment by the firm is better
2. Capital gains have preferential tax treatment
3. Retained earnings are cheaper than new equity issues
Literature:
Brennen [7]
Lee and Chang [22]
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy [25]
100% payout is best because:
1. Bird in the hand argument
2. Institutional demand
3. Valuation models
Literature:
Durand [12]
Gordon [16]
Graham and Dodd [17]
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FIGURE I (continued)
OPTIMUM DIVIDEND THEORY
There exists an optimum dividend payout because
1. Information effect on stock price
2. Signalling effect on stock price
3. Agency theory
Literature:
Bhattacharya [5, 6]
Dhrymes and Kurz [11]
Fama [14]
John and Williams [19]
McCabe [29]
Peterson and Benesh [33]
Ross [35]
STOCK REPURCHASE THEORY
Stock repurchase is preferable to dividends because:
1. Information on signalling
2. Leverage
3. Dividend tax avoidance
4. Bondholder expropriation
5. Wealth transfers among shareholders
Literature:
Dann [10]
Marsulis [27]
Vermaelen [37]
HISTORICAL DIVIDEND PAYMENT BEHAVIOR
Literature:
Brittain [8]
Fama and Babick [15]
Lee, Djarraya and Wei [23]
Lintner [24]
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many factors which might affect a firm's behavior is growth. In
investigating the relationship between stock price and dividends,
Gordon [16] and Miller and Modigliani [31] argue that the growth of
dividends is an important factor to consider. If the growth in divi-
dends is related to the growth in earnings, assets, or any other
measure of firm activity, then stratifying firms by a measure of
growth seems to be one reasonable way of evaluating dividend differ-
ences among firms.
Two opposing arguments can be found which relate growth orien-
tations of firms to their dividend/investment decisions. The first
suggests that dividend and investment decisions might not be related
for high growth firms, while they are negatively related for low
growth firms. According to this theory, if a firm commits itself to
rapid growth, a great amount of investment will be needed and internal
funds alone are usually insufficient. In order to develop and main-
tain a good capital market relationship and signal future earnings
potential so that external funds are more obtainable, the firm is
likely to pay higher dividends than otherwise although the investment
demand for the same source of funds is great (see Ross [35]). There
is an interesting argument by Miller and Modigliani [31] that dividend
disbursals convey information to the market on the future potential
profitability of a firm. Bhattacharya [5, 6] uses a signalling-theory
approach to explain firms' dividend-payment decisions. For high-
growth firms investment and dividends are less likely to be negatively
related. On the other hand, for firms with relatively little growth
potential which need less outside funds, dividend and investment are
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likely to be negatively related since they are competing uses of
internal funds.
The second theory suggests, however, that dividend and investment
decisions are also negatively related for high-growth firms. Since
high growth adversely impacts the liquidity position of firms, low
dividend payouts shall be associated with those firms (see, for
example, Weston and Brigham [39]). In addition, high growth rates
imply high profit potential, which in turn requires that earnings
be retained rather than distributed to stockholders, whose investment
alternatives might not offer higher returns. High-growth firms can
also attract capital-gains oriented investors who are in high income
brackets and are more interested in taking their income in the form of
capital gain rather than as dividends, which are subjected to higher
income tax rates. For high-growth firms, therefore, dividend and
investment decisions should also be negatively related.
In trying to reconcile these theoretical differences, John and
Williams [19] present a theoretical model of dividend behavior based
on a signalling equilibrium. If the corporate demand for cash I and
the individual demand for cash L exceed the firm's supply of cash C
such that
C < L + I (1)
then either the corporation must sell shares or the individual share-
holder must sell his shares to a new investor to raise new funds. In
either case, the sale of shares will result in a dilution for current
shareowners. By signalling with larger dividends, the management can
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increase the price per share and thereby reduce this dilution. For
the shareholder retaining a fraction of the firm, the marginal benefit
of reducing the dilution is greater for a more valuable firm than for
a lower value firm. Thus, there exists a pricing function for a
firm's stock which for high value firms offers an increase in value
for high dividends. The reduction in the dilution more than offsets
the increase in personal taxes for the shareholder. While for low
value firms, small or low dividends are valued and if the personal tax
effects exceed the reduction in dilution, a small or zero dividend is
desirable.
If the corporate plus individual demand for cash is less than the
firm's supply of cash
C > L + I (2)
then it is optimal to pay no dividends.
If L < C - I < 0, then all new shares can be sold to the old
shareholders with no dividends. And, if < L < C - I, then all
shares sold by the shareholders can be repurchased by the firm.
The John and Williams model offers a plausible explanation for the
divergent theories shown in Figure I. For the purpose of this paper
all that is needed is acceptance of the fact that high growth firms
have: (1) investment demands I such that C < L + I is always true and
(2) high value firms are high growth firms. And low growth firms have
either: (1) investment demands I such that C > L + I or (2) invest-
ment demands I such that C < L + I and low growth firms are low value
f i rms
.
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This argument allows us to hypothesize that firms with a lot of
investment opportunities (high growth) will pay large dividends to
maintain their market price. And firms with few investment oppor-
tunities (low growth) will adjust the dividend payment to fund the
investments. This asymmetrical behavior encompasses both the
theoretical and empirical work that has been done to date.
To our best knowledge, this segmented approach to investigating the
effect of growth orientations on the dividend-investment decision has
never been tested empirically or reported in the financial literature.
The purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the behaviors
of a group of high-growth and a group of low-growth firms with regard
to dividend and investment decisions. The high-growth and low-growth
firms will be formed into two separate groups with separate regression
equations estimated. It is recognized in this paper that, in addition
to growth orientation, many other factors may also affect decisions of
a specific firm. It is thus impractical to try to develop a model
capable of explaining different situations which lead to decisions of
specific firms regarding dividend and investment. In this study, the
effect of growth and dividend signalling on the average behavior of
firms will be analyzed from results obtained from pooled cross-
sectional and time-series data.
II. The Model
In this section, a model used in previous studies will first be
introduced and commented upon briefly. Two alternative models for the
study of relationships between dividend and investment decisions of
firms will then be derived.
-9-
Among studies on dividend behaviors of firms, the partial adjust-
2
ment model suggested by Lintner [24] has most often been used. Sup-
pose there are observations on N firms over T periods of time. The
Lintner model can be written in terms of the following two equations:
.
D
It B i
p
it
+
"it (3A)
4D
it
= Y(Dit " Di,t-l ) < Y < 1 (3B)
i = 1 , 2, . . . , N
t = 1, 2, ... , T
where D. is the dividend of firm i in period t, P
.
_ is the profit of
it r it r
the same firm in the same period, n is a disturbance term, D* is the
3
equilibrium (or desired) value of D. 6
1
and y are parameters to be
estimated. The coefficient of adjustment y should be greater than
zero and less than or equal to one and g is a positive fraction.
Combining equations (3A) and (3B), the following estimable
equation can be obtained:
&D
it
=
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p
it -^
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(A)
where e
. ..
= yn . • To study possible effect of investment on dividend,it ' it J
changes in capital stock which includes new investment as well as
replacement type investments, AK.
,
can be added to equation (3A) with
a coefficient a 9 as
D
Ic " a l
P
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+ a
2
AK
it
+
"it (3V)
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Equation (3A) defines the optimal dividends as the function of the
current earnings and equation (3A f ) defines the optimal dividend as
the function of both earnings and investment opportunity. If a- = 0,
then 6
1
will equal ot, , and equation (3A) and (3A' ) are equivalent.
Hence equation (3A 1 ) is a generalized specification for equation (3A).
Substituting equation (3A' ) into (3B) we obtain
AD.
t
- a Q
+ ya
1
P
±t
+ ya
2
AK.
t
- Y D + e
±]
(5)
in which ya 9 indicates the short-run effect of AK on AD and a 9 as the
long-run effect. Due to contradictory theories regarding the rela-
tionship between investment and dividend decisions of firms as dis-
cussed in the preceding section, the sign of ot 9 cannot be resolved a
priori and can only be determined empirically. If a- is estimated to
be negative and statistically significant, dividend and investment of
firms are proved to be negatively related and hence the assumption of
imperfect capital markets is supported. Otherwise, they are unrelated
and hence the implication of the perfect capital market theorem cannot
be rejected. Equation (5) is identical to one of the basic equations
used by Fama [14] to derive an empirically testable model for the
study of dividend and investment decisions. However, the basic
assumptions used to derive the model are different. Fama uses Miller
and Modigliani's [31] assumption of interdependency between D. and
AK. to derive his empirically testable equation, whereas, we use the
model derived by John and Williams [19].
The sources and uses of funds relationship of Miller and Modigliani
[31] can be defined as:
-11-
I .. f
D. = P. - AK. + F. fc (6)it it it it
where F. is the amount of external financing; P and AK are the
cash flows from operations and changes in the capital stock respec-
tively. This equation implies that the dividends payments can be
affected by cash flows, net investments and amount of external
financing.
The relationship between AK. and F. is generally used to deter-r it it
mine whether internal financing or external financing is the major
source of new investment. If F. is equal to AK. , then the invest-lt it
ment decision will not affect the dividend decision. If F. is
it
smaller than AK. , then the investment decision will have negativeit
impact to the dividend payment. These arguments do not explicitly
take into account the potential "information content" dividend-
decision behavior as suggested by Miller and Modigliani [31] or the
signalling behavior postulated by John and Williams [19]. If the
managers use dividend changes to signal the potential future earnings
of their firms, then the increase of new investments might also
increase a firm's dividend payment. To accomplish this strategy, a
manager can use more external sources of funds to finance their new
investments. Hence the estimated a ? can be used as an indicator of
examining the trade off between the relative importance of dividend
signalling and personal taxes on dividends. According to our
interpretation of John and Williams, for high growth firms, the divi-
dends signalling is generally more important than the personal tax
considerations and the estimated a ? will generally be positive. For
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low growth firms, the dividend signalling is generally not as impor-
tant as personal tax considerations and the estimated oc 9 will
generally be negative.
The specification of equation (5), however, might be biased against
possible negative relationship between dividend and investment for a
firm. If a firm enjoys greater profits in a year, it is likely that
both dividends paid out and investment of the firm will be increased,
and vice versa. Also because of inflation, AD, P and AK are even
more likely to move in the same direction if nominal data are used.
Due to raulticollinearity between P and AK, the estimated parameters
might also be subject to large sampling errors.
To avoid such potential specification problems, the model can be
formulated in terms of the dividend payout ratio instead of the dollar
amount of dividends. Rewriting equation (3A ? ) in terms of the payout
ratio gives:
D AK
—
= 8
o
+ ei-p^ + ^it (7)
it it
where u. = n. /P. . This says that a firm's target dividend payoutM it it it J ° r
ratio is equal to a constant term plus a variable term which depends
on the firm's investment during time t. According to John and
Williams [19]:
Given sufficiently large demands for external funds
I - C + L, firms with higher expected returns and
thereby higher values X have higher payout ratio...
In effect as the firm has higher demands for investment we should
expect the more valuable (high growth) firms to increase their payout
ratios.
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Following the adjustment argument of Lintner [25] we can rewrite
equation (3B) in terms of the desired payout ration and the actual
payout ratio:
D D D.
A(p^) = Y '[(-H)* -r±^±] (8)
it it i,t-l
Note y' is c^e partial adjustment coefficient for the payout ratio
instead of the partial adjustment coefficient for dividends per share.
By combining equations (7) and (8), the following estimable equation
can be obtained.
D. AK . D
.
*{& - * y' *hi'771 ~ rfM:r+ e" (9)it it i>t-l
In this payout ratio form both dividend and investment are normalized
by earnings, hence, the specification of equation (9) is no longer
biased against a possible negative relationship between dividend and
investment. If a firm earns more profit in a year, both D. /P. andJ it it
AK. /P. do not necessarily increase at the same time although both
it it J °
D and AK. are likely to be greater. If a firm primarily depends on
internal funds for investment, then as AK. /P. increases, D. /P. is
' it it it it
likely to decrease, and vice versa. Hence these two variables of this
firm are likely to be negatively related. On the other hand, if a
firm raises the payout ratio or holds it constant in order to maintain
a good capital market relationship for attracting outside funds for
investment, D. /P. and AK. /P. of this firm might move in the same
it it it it &
direction or show no relationship at all. In addition, since both
dividend and investment are expressed as a ratio to profits, inflation
can no longer produce spurious correlation between dependent and
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explanatory variables. Equation (9) is the basic structure to be
estimated in this study. According to this specification, B,y' is the
short-run effect of changes in investment ratio on the dividend payout
ratio and g.. is the long-run effect.
As mentioned in the first section, the firms covered in this study
are highly heterogeneous. There are different factors which affect
the dividend and investment decisions of firms. It is very difficult
if not impossible, to specify a single model capable of reflecting
different factors affecting the behaviors of all firms. If relevant
variables are omitted from a regression equation, as is well known in
econometrics, the estimates obtained are likely to be biased. The
time-series of each firm is too short to allow the estimation of an
equation for each firm with adequate variables and degrees of freedom.
Desirable results, therefore, cannot be obtained if an equation is
estimated for each firm. In this study, cross-sectional and time-
series data are pooled in regression to overcome the problem of insuf-
ficient degrees of freedom. The error component model is used to take
into account the effect of omitted variable on the estimated coef-
ficients. Appendix A contains a discussion of the econometric proce-
dure used for the empirical estimations.
III. Empirical Results
The data for this study is taken from the 1982 annual industrial
file of the Compustat tapes. The tapes contain data for 20 years
(1963-1982). Since data for 1982 are incomplete for most of the firms
and data for the first two years are lost due to the need to take the
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lags of the variables, the sample period of this study is 17 years
(1965-1981). The variables in equation (9) are measured as
D. = Common dividends declared on the common stock of company i
it in year t.
P = Net income less preferred dividend requirements, which is
the net income available for common,
K = Net plant and equipment, which represents gross plant minus
accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion, amortiza-
tion, etc.
The companies listed in the New York. Stock Exchange and also in the
S & P 400 Industrial Index are the data base of this study. However,
those companies, which did not have complete data, did not have posi-
tive earnings, or did not pay out dividends in any one year during the
sample period, are excluded from the sample. The actual sample in-
cludes 256 firms.
Before engaging in regression analysis, all of the firms in the
sample were ranked according to the average annual growth rate of
total assets in the sample period and divided into three groups: the
high-growth group (85 firms), the middle-growth group (86 firms) and
the low-growth group (85 firms). The growth rate of total assets is
used as the measure of growth, this measure can be a proxy for the
growth in earnings. This is a fairly good proxy, i.e., growth in
assets is approximately equal to growth in earnings (cash flow) if the
rate of return earned on new investment is greater than what the
market requires for assets of equivalent risk. In effect, the new
investment is made in projects with a positive net present value. The
mean values of payout ratio (D /P ) and investment-earning ratioli
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( AK./P.) are then calculated for each firm in the sample period.
Growth rates and payout ratios for these groups are listed in Table I.
Only the extreme groups were used in the remainder of the study, i.e.,
the middle group was omitted. As a preliminary study on the rela-
tionship between dividend and investment decisions of firms, the mean
of payout ratio was regressed on the mean of investment-earning ratio
for the groups of high-growth and low-growth firms. Regression results
are presented in Table II. The table shows that the relationship
between D./P. and AK./P. are strikingly different between the high-11 11
growth and low-growth groups of firms. For low-growth firms, D./P. is
negatively and significantly affected by AK./P.; and AK./P. alone
explains D./P. by almost 50 percent. For high-growth firms, D./P. and11 11
—2
AK./P. are positively and significantly related. However, R is only
o
about 6 percent. Such preliminary results suggest that for low-growth
firms dividend decisions and investment decisions are negatively
related, but for high-growth firms they are not negatively related.
To further study the relationship between dividend and investment
decisions of firms, the error component model discussed in Appendix A
is applied to the data described above for both high-growth and low-
growth firms, each regression containing 1445 observations (85 firms
and 17 years). Estimated results are given in Table III. Those
obtained from OLS and LSDV are also presented in the table for
comparison.
Table IIIA presents the regression results for the payout ratio
form of the model, equation (9) and Table IIIB presents the dollar per
share form of the model, equation (5). All of the estimated coef-
ficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and the
-17-
TABLE I. Growth Rates of Assets and
Payout Ratios by Group of Firms
High Middle Low
Growth Firms Growth Firms Growth Firms
Dividend Maximum 0.783 0.962 1.505
Payout
Ratio Minimum 0.148 0.237 0.248
(mean value in
the sample Mean 0.447 0.527 0.595
period) (standard
error) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Growth rate Maximum 37.15 12.12 8.30
of real
Assets Minimum 12.20 8.32 3.37
(mean percent-
age annual Mean 16.33 9.96 6.57
growth) (Standard
error) (4.54) (1.10) (3.37)
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TABLE II.
Empirical Relationships between the Average
Payout Ratio and the Average Investment-Earning
Ratio of Two Groups of Firms
(Dependent Variable = D./P.)
Constant AK./P. R D.W. N
1 1
Low Growth Firms 0.597* -0.221* 0.488 1.79 85
(49.19) (-8.89)
High Growth Firms 0.434* 0.023* 0.059 1.74 85
(32.31) (2.29)
NOTE: D^/P^ is the mean of payout ratio and AK^/P^ is the mean of
investment-earnings ratio for ith firm in the sample period.
Figures in parentheses are t ratios. The N is the number of
firms in the group.
*Indicates that a coefficient is statistically significant at the
0.05 level.
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TABLE III.
Estimated Results Obtained from
the Pooled Data
Dit AK
A. Payout Ratio A(p—) = B qy + 8-jY'
it it
D,
P
,
i,t-l
- y + <
i,t-l it
(9)
Estimation Method Constant AK. /P. D
- , i/ p - , i r2i,t-l i,t-l
Low Growth Firms
OLS 0.570 -0.111 -0.884
(27.92) (-12.36) (-35.31)
LSDV 0.689 -0.108 -0.965
(5.31) (-11.84) (-36.92)
GLS 0.583 -0.111 -0.904
(19.86) (-12.42) (-36.04)
High Growth Firms
OLS 0.314 0.051 -0.796
(35.72) (51.79) (-51.24)
LSDV 0.407 0.053 -0.906
(9.50) (62.93) (-65.28)
GLS 0.356 0.053 -0.891
(17.70) (63.01) (-64.95)
0.480
0.499
0.501
0.792
0.860
0.860
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TABLE III (continued)
B. Dividend Per Share tf> = <x Q + YC^P^ + Ya 2AKit - yQ± fc , + e it (5;
Estimation Method Constant it iKit D1>t-i r2
Low Growth Firms
OLS -0.0076 0.2755 -0.0318 -0.5778 0.968
(-3.07) (26.08) (26.08) (-34.34)
LSDV -0.0124 0.2828 -0.0268 -0.5688 0.967
(-0.81) (26.59) (-2.56) (-33.69)
GLS -0.2041 0.2723 -0.0501 -0.6189 0.967
(-1.10) (31.78) (-5.17) (-45.13)
High Growth Firms
OLS -0.0110 0.0622 0.0137 -0.9766 0.992
(-5.81) (13.22) (18.41) (-83.39)
LSDV -0.0147 0.0721 0.0136 -0.9657 0.992
(-7.49) (14.31) (7.40) (-80.90)
GLS -0.0141 0.0673 0.0115 -0.9800 0.992
(-3.85) (14.65) (6.56) (-87.65)
NOTE: Both time and firm dummies were included when LSDV was used.
The coefficients for the dummy variables are not presented here
to save the space; they are available from the author. The
figures in parentheses are t-ratios. There are 85 firms and 17
years of observations each for both high-growth and low-growth
firms.
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coefficient for both D. ,/P. , and D. .. has the correct signi,t-l i,t-l i,t-l &
regardless of the estimation methods or the groups of firms considered.
The coefficients associated with both D. , and D. ,/P. , arei,t-l i»t-l i,t-l
partial adjustment coefficients. Partial adjumstments obtained from
equation (5) for low growth firms are lower than those from equation
(9). However, partial adjustment coefficients for equation (5) for
high growth firms are similar to those obtained from equation (9).
These differences can be explained as follows.
By substituting equation (7) into (3B), we obtain
AK
D
it "
Di,t-i " ^ 6 o
+ 6
i T~ " Di,t-i ] + error (10)it
Solving this for change in the dividend payout ratio in period t
yields
:
./ it, „ it , i , t-1 ,, N i,t-l, ,,,vA(p—) - YS + y8
1
-p [y-2 (1-t) p-2 ] (ID
it it i,t-l i,t
Equation (11) is directly derived from equation (5) by normalization.
D
i t-1
D
i t-1
It will reduce to equation (9) if —
—
l = —
—
l
. In other words, if
i,t-l i,t
P. - = P.
,
then partial adjustment coefficient for dividend per
share payments is equal to that of the partial adjustment coefficient
for the payout ratio.
In comparing the adjustment coefficient (y
'
) for the payout ratio
with y for the dividend per share, we see that the estimated coef-
ficients for the payout ratio are not significantly different from
minus one for both the high and low growth firms. This indicates that
the management of both types of firms adjust the firm's payout ratio
quite quickly to some target payout ratio. The values of y coef-
-22-
ficient in the dividend per share model present a slightly different
behavior. For low growth firms the adjustment of dividends per share
to a target level is slower than for the high growth firms whose coef-
ficient of adjustment is not significantly different from one.
Estimated results for the same group of firms are not sensitive to
the estimation methods used. Generally, the estimates obtained from
GLS and LSDV have slightly smaller standard errors than those obtained
from OLS. A comparison of the coefficients of the investment variable
for the two groups of firms again discloses the striking difference in
behaviors between low-growth and high-growth firms regarding dividend
and investment decisions. The estimated coefficient of AK. /P. forit it
the low-growth firms is negative and significant while that for high-
growth firms is positive and significant. Such empirical results con-
form with the hypothesis that for low-growth firms dividend and
investment decisions are negatively related, but they are not nega-
tively related for high-growth firms.
One of the two theories explained in the first section, that divi-
dend and investment decisions of high-growth firms should be nega-
tively related, is thus rejected. The results suggest that
high-growth firms are not likely to reduce the payout ratio in order
to increase investment since such action might detract from their
ability to attract external funds. For low-growth firms, dividend and
investment decisions are negatively related since they are competing
uses of funds. The above results differ with the finding of Fama
[14], that dividend and investment decisions of firms are not related.
-23-
The finding of Dhrymes and Kurz [11] that the two decisions are nega-
tively related, is not fully supported. The results of this study
indicate that the relationship between this investment and dividend
decision depends upon the investment opportunities available to the
individual firm.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
In the preceding sections, theories on the effect of growth orien-
tation on dividend-investment decisions of firms has been introduced.
A new theoretical model for the study of relationship between dividend
and investment decisions of firms has been presented. The model is
based on the partial adjustment model and the signalling-theory
approach. The payout ratio is used in the Lintner adjustment model
framework so that spurious correlation and multicollinearity problems
can be avoided or reduced. Statistical methods for the estimation of
equations from pooled cross-sectional and time-series data have been
introduced. Empirical results have shown that for low-growth firms
the mean values of payout ratios over the sample period are negatively
and significantly related to the mean values of investment-earning
ratios. For high-growth firms, they are positively and significantly
related. Results obtained from the pooled data also revealed a posi-
tive and significant relationship between dividend decisions and
investment decisions of high-growth firms, and a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between the two decisions of low-growth firms. The
results suggest therefore that for high-growth firms the desire to pay
reasonable dividends and hence signalling earning potential causes
dividend decisions of such firms not to be adversely affected by
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investment decisions, while for low growth firms investment decisions
do adversely affect dividend decisions.
Theoretically, this paper has used the John and Williams [19]
signalling equilibrium approach to derive an indicator for explaining
the generalized interaction relationship between the dividend decision
and investment decisions. In light of the myriad of previous studies
which have reached varied conclusions, this research provides an
explanation, which is empirically supported, which can be used to
reconcile the apparent differences concerning the relationship between
dividends and investments.
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Appendix A
According to the model suggested by Balestra and Nerlove [2] and
Wallace and Hussain [38], the error term in Equation (9) can be writ-
ten in terms of the sum of three components: e . = w. + v + n
. _
,
l l t it
where w. represents the time invariant, unobserved firm effects, v
l t
represents firm invariant, unobserved time effects on the dividend
9
payout ratio of a firm, and u. represents the remaining effects
which are assumed to vary in both cross-section and time dimensions.
One way to estimate the parameters in equation (9) is to treat
w. and v as constants. Under the assumption that u. are independentit r it
with zero means and constant variances, least squares regression of
A(D. /P. ) on AK. /P
.
_ and D. ,/P. , and firm and time dummies canit it it it i,t-l i,t-l
be used to estimate the parameters. This approach is known as the
least squares with dummy variable technique (LSDV). As indicated by
Maddala [26], the use of the dummy variable technique may eliminate a
major portion of the variation among both the dependent and explanatory
variables if the between firm and between time-period variation is
large. In addition, in some cases, there is also a loss of a substan-
tial number of degrees of freedom. Hence LSDV may not be an efficient
method of estimation.
Another approach to deal with equation (9) is to treat the error
components w. and v as random. In this case, instead of N w' s and Tit
v's, we estimate only the means and the variances of the disturbances
of w's and v's. This is known as the error component model, wherein
the regression error is assumed to be composed of three components—one
associated with time, another with firms, and the third variable both
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in the time and cross-section dimensions. The assumptions on the com-
ponents of the error term are that they are independent random
variables with constant variances. Without loss of generality, it is
also assumed that they have zero means. To estimate the parameters in
(9), generalized least squares (GLS) can be used. In matrix notation,
equation (9) can be written as:
Y = X£ + e (Al)
where Y is an NT x 1 vector, the elements of which are the observations
on &(D. /P. ) for N firms in T periods, X is an NT x 3 matrix withit it
one's in the first column and observations on (AK. /P. ) andit it
(D ,/P. , ) in the second column. e is an NT x 1 vector con-i,t-l i,t-l
taining the error terms. Under the assumptions on the error com-
ponents, the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance terms
e is the following NT x NT matrix:
E(ee f ) = ft =
^
a 2 l
v T
o 2 l
v T
oh
v T
a 2A
w T
v T
a
2
I
v T
a 2 l
v T
2s
(A2)
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where I is a (T x T) identity matrix and L is a (T x T) matrix
defined as:
*T
-= 1
w
w
(A3)
2 2 2in which o is the variance of w. , o is the variance of v
,
is
w i ' v t ' u
2 2 2 2
variance of u. , and o = a + a + a . Given equation (A2) , it isit w v u
well known that the generalized least squares estimates of B, if
2 2 2
°"
,
o and are known, is
w' v u '
B - (X'fl
2
X) 2 (X'rt^Y) (A4)
with variance-covariance matrix
Var (3) = (X'ft
2
X) 2 (A5)
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where X' is the transpose of matrix X, GLS estimates may be more effi-
cient than LSDV or OLS estimates because they enable us to extract
some information about the regression parameters from the between
group and between time-period variations. In finite samples, Nerlove
[31] has also found that it produces little bias.
2 2 2
In actuality a
,
cr and are usually unknown, but they can beJ W* V u J J
estimated by the analysis of covariance techniques as follows (see,
for example, Amemiya [1]):
NT . T . N 2
u
=
(N-1KT-1)
±l J^it ""I J eit "If^ e itJ (A6)
% i r i N T 2 %
a = — I =— Z I Z e ) = a I (A7)
w T L (N-1)T . .\ , it J u J K /i=l t=l
9 1 1
L
" * 9
a = TT I
^
—
E
I
Z e. J - a
z
j (A8)vN itu
N(T-l) t=l 1=1 1C
where e represents residuals obtained by applying the least squares
method to the pooled data, assuming that w. and v are constants to be
estimated rather than random variables.
2 2
If o" and o are estimated to equal zero, then ft in (A2) is a
w v
NT x NT identifying matrix and hence equations (A3) and (A4) are the
same as the OLS estimators. On the other hand, if the estimate of
2 2 2
o /o approaches one and approaches zero, equations (A3) and (AA)
2 2
are equivalent to LSDV with firm dummies, if o /a approaches one and
2
o approaches zero, they are equivalent to LSDV with time dummies.
Hence in applying GLS rather than OLS or LSDV, the existence of other
time or firm effects can be determined by the sample rather than
-29-
assumed and the relative weights given to between and within firm and
time-period variations for the estimation of the parameters are deter-
mined by the data. In OLS it is assumed that the between and within
variations are just added up; in LSDV the between variation is com-
pletely ignored. (See Maddala [26], pp. 341-344).
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FOOTNOTES
Previous research uses either cross-sectional or time-series data,
we use pooled cross-sectional and time-series data to improve the pre-
cision of our empirical results.
2
See Fama [14], Brittain [8], Fama and Babiak [15], Mayer and Kuh
[28], Dhrymes and Kurz [11], and others.
3
These variables are the same as those used in Fama [14]. They
will be defined more precisely in Section III.
4
Yosef and Lev [4] investigate the impact of inflation on the earn-
ings and dividend relationship. They conclude that the various price
adjustments made to reported earnings following FASB - No. 33
(Financial Reporting and Changing Prices) do not convey useful infor-
mation about firms' dividend decisions. Hence conventionally reported
historical cost earnings remain the best measure to account for divi-
dend changes. Therefore the differences between accounting earnings
and a cash flow approach seem to have little affect on the dividend
and investment analysis.
If both profits and external financing are held fixed then the
sources and uses constraint of equation (6) forces investment and
dividends to the negatively related. This is only a required sources
and uses of funds relationship. However, our study investigates an
economic relationship instead of a required relationship between divi-
dends and investment. This study investigates whether actual invest-
ment is changed by dividend policy, i.e., their economic relationship.
The Compustat tapes are documented in the Compustat Manual
,
supplied by Standard & Poor's Compustat Services, Inc., 7400 S. Alton
Court, Englewood, Colorado 80112.
A list of these firms is available from the authors.
o
To investigate the effect of high payout and low payout in capi-
tal asset pricing, Bar-Yosef and Kolodny [3] and Lee and Chang [22]
have used the same method to reduce (or eliminate) the classification
errors. We use a similar method to perform our empirical studies.
9
The firm effect refers to the effect of factors affecting the
behavior of an individual firm; it is constant over time. The time
effect refers to the economic condition of particular time point; it
varies over time.
For studies of this sort see, for example, Balestra and Nerlove
[2], Wallace and Hussain [38], Maddala [26], and Chang and Lee [9].
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